#ukrainewar #ukrainewarupdate #military #militarydevelopments #militarystrategy On August 11, Ukrainian long‑range drones hit two deep targets: the Orenburg Helium Plant—cited by Ukrainian intelligence as Russia’s sole rocket‑grade helium source—and the Arzamas Instrument‑Making Plant in Nizhny Novgorod, a supplier of guidance units and gyros for Kh‑32/Kh‑101/Kh‑59 missiles. These are verification bottlenecks—helium pressurizes and purges tanks; cleanrooms certify IMUs and control blocks—so even short stoppages can delay test/acceptance cycles. Regional officials reported night‑time drone activity and closures, while independent defense outlets logged damage at Arzamas. Note: the “only helium plant” claim is contested—Amur GPP has shipped liquid helium since 2023—so the near‑term effect is best read as friction and delay, not permanent loss. Tactically, Ukraine likely used Liutyi and Bober variants to trade cheap platforms for expensive Russian intercepts and operator hours. We map how “acceptance waits → delivery waits → salvo waits” can stretch a single night into a week of planning stress—then test what could break this forecast.
